13 Years After Gaddafi: What Has Become of Libya? A State Without a Nation, a War Without End, a Future Without a Master

Written by Anthony Trad (MSc Political Science)

In the relentless noise and daily turmoil of a world fixated on a handful of so-called “priority” crises, we tend to push other conflicts, equally critical to global stability and our own strategic interests, into the background. Libya is one such blind spot in today’s chaos. Overshadowed by more high-profile confrontations, such as the war in Ukraine, the conflict and post-war scenario in Gaza, or the growing Sino-American rivalry, it has largely vanished from both diplomatic and media radars. Not because its situation has stabilised, but because its instability has become routine, a chronic crisis that no one seems willing to confront.

As vast as Iran yet as sparsely populated as Lebanon, Libya sits at the crossroads of energy and migration routes, endowed with rich hydrocarbon reserves yet fragmented by deep internal divisions. Today, it is a fractured territory where institutions have collapsed, leaving behind two rival governments, an unchecked web of militias, and foreign interference that dictates the national agenda. Thirteen years after the fall of dictator Muammar Gaddafi, Libya is neither in full-scale war nor in genuine peace, but trapped in an unstable and volatile limbo where predatory logic and oil interests outweigh any ambition for the rule of law. At the mercy of internal power struggles and external forces exploiting its chaos for strategic ends, Libya teeters between collapse and reconfiguration, with no sign of a sustainable solution in sight.

So, who truly governs Libya? What interests are clashing within its borders? And above all, does Libya still have a future as a unified nation, or is it doomed to become a forsaken territory, endlessly preyed upon by foreign ambitions and unchecked interference?

The Current Power Struggle in Libya: An Irreconcilable Divide

Thirteen years after Gaddafi’s fall, Libya is no longer a functioning state but a fragmented battleground where two irreconcilable factions impose their own order, each backed by foreign patrons with conflicting interests.

In the East, Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar, the self-proclaimed “strongman” of Cyrenaica, rules over 70% of the country and controls three-quarters of its oil resources. A former loyalist of Gaddafi, he fell from grace after the Chadian war in 1987 and was exfiltrated by the CIA. Taking refuge in Virginia, he spent nearly two decades under U.S. intelligence oversight, seen as a potential figure to overthrow Libya’s dictatorship. But when he returned in 2011, it was not Washington but Moscow, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi that seized the opportunity to elevate him, positioning him as a bulwark against Islamists and a tool for their regional influence. With their backing, Haftar has built a parallel state – a regular army, an autonomous administration, and an economic structure entirely disconnected from Tripoli. In August 2024, he launched a major offensive in Fezzan under the pretext of “fighting trafficking and terrorism”. In reality, this operation aimed to secure strategic Sahelian routes, tightening his grip on the flow of weapons, hydrocarbons, and migrants. His military advance has further isolated Tripoli, increasingly encircled, and has reignited fears of a new escalation.

In the West, the UN-recognised Government of National Unity (GNU), led by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, survives only thanks to Turkish support. Tripoli exists solely under Ankara’s military protection, its international recognition masking a deep structural weakness. More a clan leader than a statesman, Dbeibah barely controls anything beyond the capital, which remains at the mercy of Tripoli’s unruly militias, each enforcing its own set of rules.

As for elections, routinely presented by the UN as the last hope for stabilisation, they are little more than a diplomatic mirage. Neither Haftar nor Dbeibah is willing to risk a vote they might lose. Since 2014, every electoral attempt has been sabotaged or abandoned, reducing even the idea of a democratic transition to the realm of fiction.

Who Can Prevail? Haftar’s Gradual Ascent to Dominance

While Libya’s partition seems all but certain, the balance of power is shifting. Haftar advances, Tripoli retreats. Rather than a dramatic military conquest, the Eastern commander is securing a slow but steady victory through economic strangulation and territorial encirclement.

Militarily, the Libyan National Army (LNA) holds a decisive advantage. Backed by Russian, Egyptian, and Emirati arms deliveries, Haftar’s forces now boast an upgraded arsenal, including drones, air defence systems, and enhanced logistical support. By controlling Libya’s key strategic routes – from the Oil Crescent to the Fezzan – Haftar does more than dominate the battlefield; he joysticks the country’s economy.

But Haftar’s most formidable weapon remains oil. With 75% of Libya’s oil production under his control (as the country’s key export infrastructure is concentrated in Cyrenaica) he holds the nation’s finances hostage. Oil, which accounts for 98% of public revenue and 60% of GDP, is Libya’s only real economic asset. In 2024, he demonstrated his power by imposing a targeted blockade on oil terminals, suffocating Tripoli and plunging the Central Bank into an unprecedented crisis.

Tripoli, meanwhile, is in a defensive position, more vulnerable than ever. Its army survives only by Erdogan’s will. In 2019, Haftar’s offensive on the capital was halted at the last moment by a last-ditch Turkish military intervention. Since then, the Government of National Unity (GNU) has relied entirely on Ankara’s support, which supplies it with Bayraktar drones, defence systems, and indirect military presence – via Syrian mercenaries. But Ankara is wavering, reassessing its priorities. Bogged down in Syria, where it seeks to stabilise ties with Damascus’ new ruler, Ahmed Al-Charah, while containing the Kurdish threat, Turkey may reconsider its costly involvement in Libya. Without Ankara’s military umbrella, Tripoli could fall within weeks, if not days. Haftar and his allies would then have a clear path to walk to the capital, mirroring the fall of Damascus in December last year, which ended half a century of Assad rule.

Meanwhile, Russia is methodically advancing its own agenda. With the fall of Bashar al-Assad, its main Middle Eastern ally, Moscow is redeploying troops and S-300 and S-400 air defence systems to Libya, strengthening its ties with Haftar. In 2024, the number of Russian troops in Libya doubled to 1,800, while the Kremlin actively negotiates a naval base in Tobruk, having already secured land bases in Maettan al-Sarra, near the strategic Chadian and Sudanese borders. The goal? To replicate the “Syrian model” by locking down Libya’s east and extending influence into the Sahel, where post-Wagner “Africa Corps” mercenaries are systematically dismantling the French military presence.

While Moscow and Ankara freely reshape Libya’s future, the West remains a passive spectator. The EU, divided between French caution and Italian pragmatism, lacks a coherent strategy, settling instead for a short-term, migration-focused approach. As for the United States, preoccupied with Ukraine and Gaza, it has effectively abandoned Libya.

A War Without End, a Libya Without a Future?

Libya has become a 21st-century laboratory of chaos: a failed state, a non-country whose fate is no longer in the hands of Tripolitans or Benghazians, but dictated by the strategic calculations of Moscow, Ankara, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi.

No optimistic scenario is on the horizon. A military stabilisation imposed by Haftar and his allies would cement the country under Russo-Egyptian influence, at the cost of a hostile realignment against the West.

Could a new open war break out? If Turkey were to reignite its confrontation with Haftar, the balance of power could shift – but that remains unlikely. Erdogan’s priorities now lie in HTS-controlled Syria. Meanwhile, Tripoli’s growing isolation appears inevitable.

Europe, despite being on the front line of both migration and energy concerns, lacks the will and capacity to act. Washington, absorbed by Ukraine and the broader Middle East, has abandoned the Libyan dossier, leaving the country in the hands of the most ambitious regional players.

Is a political compromise still possible? Nothing suggests so. Encircled and weakened, Tripoli no longer has the means to resist indefinitely. The question is no longer who will win, but how Haftar will impose himself and at what cost to Mediterranean stability.

Once a driving force in North Africa under Gaddafi, Libya is now a forsaken land, destined to be plundered, fragmented, and occupied. The West may choose to ignore it, but sooner or later, Libya will remind its European neighbours of its presence.