China's Evolving Military Diplomacy in the Global South

Written by Marina Gruzer (BSc International Relations and Chinese)

Executive Summary

• Protecting Chinese investments, assets, and citizens abroad, especially those involved in BRI-related infrastructure projects, is a growing concern for China as its global economic footprint expands.

• China employs various military diplomatic methods, including joint exercises, special envoys, and peacekeeping efforts, along with the establishment of its first foreign military base in Djibouti, to project power and foster stability in key regions.

• Special envoys have played a crucial role in China’s military diplomacy, particularly in mediating conflicts in the Middle East and Africa, such as Arab-Israeli tensions and Sudan-South Sudan disputes. China's military diplomacy also serves to assert its territorial claims, particularly in Taiwan and the South China Sea, where it uses senior-level defence dialogues and military exercises to promote the "One China Principle" and reinforce its sovereignty claims in these contested regions.

• The establishment of China’s first foreign military base in Djibouti enhances its ability to project power in a geopolitically critical region, near the Horn of Africa and the Strait of Hormuz, though its logistical network remains less developed compared to Western military bases.

Background: China’s Growing Diplomatic and Military Engagement in the Global South

In the last decade, China has been increasing its diplomatic engagement across the Global South via trade agreements, transnational projects such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and by promoting South-South cooperation within intergovernmental organisations. Among these initiatives, China has put significant emphasis on developing its military diplomacy to protect strategic interests and contribute to peace and security within key regions. The official definition in the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Military Terminology describes military diplomacy as ‘[international engagements] including military personnel exchange, military negotiations, arms control negotiations, military aid, military intelligence cooperation, military technology cooperation, international peacekeeping [and] military alliance activities’. Between 2003 and 2016, the PLA conducted 349 military exercises, 274 naval port calls and 2,162 meetings with foreign partners. However, in 2023, Chinese military diplomacy engagement saw a considerable increase from COVID-19 pandemic levels with 66 defence exchanges, 24 joint military exercises, 61 bilateral meetings and 27 naval port calls in that year alone. This reflects increasing Chinese security concerns in the global south as the majority of these engagements were carried out with Southeast Asian, African and Middle Eastern partners. Arguably, these concerns include territorial sovereignty, such as the Taiwan and South China Sea disputes, access to strategic resources and supporting security for overseas Chinese citizens and assets. 

Economic and Security Interests Driving China’s Global Military Diplomacy 

The Global South has significant strategic relevance for Chinese economic interests abroad. For example, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan African regions are crucial in acquiring energy resources such as oil, gas and minerals while also providing large overseas markets for Chinese goods. In 2022 and 2023, five out of China’s top ten oil suppliers were Middle Eastern partners, including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, United Arab Emirates, Oman and Kuwait, accounting for over 50% of China’s oil imports. Similarly, China relies on countries in Southeast Asia for much of its coal imports, such as Indonesia who accounted for 55.8% of Chinese coal imports in 2023.  Therefore, security in the global south is central to China’s energy security, especially considering that coal and oil accounted for over 78.9% of Chinese energy consumption in 2022. 

Secondly, China’s military diplomacy is likely a reflection of growing pressure to provide security for Chinese investments, assets and citizens abroad. Concerns for the security of Chinese nationals and assets abroad have become particularly crucial in light of the conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East. In October 2023, ‘four Chinese nationals had been killed’ amidst the resumed conflict in Palestine. Cases like this reflect a growing need for military stability in areas where Chinese nationals could be at risk, especially with a growing number of Chinese students and professionals travelling abroad. More broadly, few countries involved in China’s military diplomacy efforts are not part of the BRI, a transnational project initiated in 2013 by Xi Jinping to promote interconnectivity, energy transportation and trade. In this way, China is extending this type of foreign policy to nations which already have a pre-established positive relationship with China and are areas with significant Chinese investments and assets. A decade after its announcement, China has invested over USD 1 trillion into infrastructure construction contracts and non-financial investments across approximately 150 countries, majority of which are in the Global South, as part of this project. With growing Chinese foreign investments and assets, the number of Chinese workers and citizens living abroad is also a crucial factor in Chinese security concerns. The Chinese diaspora is the largest in the world with 10.7 million Chinese living overseas and approximately 60 million with their descendants included. Consequently, this demonstrates a growing pressure to ensure the protection of Chinese assets and citizens abroad as China becomes increasingly interconnected with the global economy. 

By applying military diplomatic initiatives, China seeks opportunities to advance national interests and enhance defence capacities. These interests abroad include the rising tensions over territorial and sovereignty disputes in areas such as Taiwan and the South China Sea. Utilising the senior-level meetings and strategic dialogues, Beijing creates a platform to promote its territorial interests such as the ‘One China Principle’ and China’s sovereignty claims over Taiwan. Partner countries and defence ministers involved in China’s military diplomacy senior-level meetings often confirm their support for the ‘One China Principle’ and therefore can strengthen China’s claims in the international community. Furthermore, establishing a more prominent military presence within the Global South is central in China’s effort to challenge the entrenched Western military presence. As of 2021, the US maintains over 750 military bases abroad, of which 200 are stationed in South Korea, Japan and Australia. This implies a significant limitation on China’s hard power projection capabilities. Therefore, these three factors, combined with pre-existing Western military pressure, play a significant role in motivating Beijing’s increasing military diplomacy as a means of consolidating Chinese national interests abroad. 

Diverse Approaches to Military Diplomacy: Exercises, Special Envoys and Strategic Military Bases

China has actively engaged in several formats of military diplomacy to establish a hard power presence abroad and enhance its capacity to protect its interests. In addition to senior level meetings, military exercises have been a significant component in China’s military diplomacy in the Global South. This parallels the increase in US and UK naval military exercises with Southeast Asian partners, which serve as a response to China’s growing prominence. For example, the US has recently conducted training with the Philippines as part of an effort to increase US-Philippines military cooperation and coordination in the disputed South China Sea. In general, in 2023, China’s military exercises have focused on Southeast Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East, all of which are crucial for China’s energy security and are geopolitical regions of interest. For example, exercises in Southeast Asia, with Indonesia, Pakistan and Vietnam, focused on maritime security and counter-terrorism measures. This reflects China’s security concern in the region due to the Indo-Pacific’s significance in global trade and its role in Chinese sovereignty claims over the South China Sea and Taiwan. 

Another method of military diplomacy employed by China has been the use of special envoys to regions of conflict in Africa and the Middle East. This seems to be a relatively unique approach used by China, while other powers, such as the US, conduct peacebuilding initiatives through more direct high level negotiations. Since 2002, China ‘established four special envoys’ in the region with the aim of contributing to Middle Eastern and North African security to limit threats to Chinese regional interests. For over twenty years, the special envoys have been involved in trying to resolve regional security dilemmas such as Arab-Israeli tensions. In the early 2010s, China’s special envoy for Africa contributed to mediating between Sudan and South Sudan and advising on economic and security issues in the region. More recently in 2023, China was also involved in promoting dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Iran and the re-normalisation of their bilateral relations. Therefore, a central aspect of China’s military diplomacy seems to reflect a broader aim of taking on a mediator role in regions of interest within the Global South. This is likely because promoting stability and cooperation in the Middle East and Africa is important for maintaining stable access to energy supply chains and markets, which are some of China’s key foreign interests.

Finally, a crucial development in Chinese military diplomacy has been the opening of China’s first foreign military base in Djibouti in 2017. Djibouti, situated near the Horn of Africa and the strait of Hormuz, carries significant geopolitical importance due to its access to Middle Eastern maritime trade flows and control over the approach to the Suez Canal. A Chinese military base in Djibouti offers a degree of enhanced power projection capacity in the region and capacity to protect trade interests. Despite this, the PLA’s logistics remain relatively limited, despite Xi Jinping’s military modernisation efforts, and military supply chains remain inefficient in comparison to the USA’s network of foreign bases. Currently, the US maintains at least 750 military bases across 80 countries which makes PLA presence in Djibouti unlikely to be a significant strategic challenge for Western powers in the short term. 

Soft Power and Historical Alliances in the Global South

Nevertheless, the PLA has had a presence in the Global South long before establishing a base in Djibouti and has, for example, supported colonial ‘independence movements in Africa during the 1950s and 60s’. Additionally, the PLA was central in providing military medical aid to over 50 Global South partners during the COVID-19 pandemic. By using Western colonial history as leverage and being involved in constructive initiatives, such as the provision of medical support during the COVID-19 pandemic, China reinforces its popularity among governments in the Global South. In this way, China’s military diplomacy is multifaceted and aims to both enhance Chinese hard power projection capabilities while also contributing to soft power initiatives.  

Conclusion

In conclusion, China's expanding military diplomacy in the Global South reflects its strategic ambitions to safeguard economic interests, protect overseas assets, and promote its territorial sovereignty claims. The Belt and Road Initiative, a cornerstone of China's foreign policy, has deepened China's ties with countries in Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, where military engagements such as joint exercises, port calls, and defence exchanges have become critical. As China increasingly relies on the Global South for energy resources and trade markets, its efforts to strengthen military ties are aimed at ensuring stability and security in these regions. Simultaneously, China uses military diplomacy to assert its geopolitical interests, particularly in contested regions like Taiwan and the South China Sea. Through high-level defence dialogues,  military exercises, special envoy negotiations and even humanitarian initiatives, China enhances its influence and reinforces its global standing. While challenges remain, especially in competing with Western military presence, China’s multifaceted approach continues to solidify its role as a key player in the Global South. Therefore, China is likely to continue reinforcing its economic presence in the Global South, by establishing security for foreign-based Chinese nationals and assets, and extending Chinese hard power projection capacity to defend political interests and access to key resources.