Democratic Backsliding in Eastern Europe: Vertical Accountability, European Security and Article 7

Written by Alberto Ornaghi (BSc PPE)

Across the world, democracy is under attack. The success of populist far-right parties over the past decade has led to a resurgence of “strongman politics”. Many leaders who fit Viktor Orbán’s infamous description of “illiberal democrats” have come to power. The most salient example is likely Trump’s return to the White House this year, a man who said he would be a dictator “on day one”, blatantly plans to replace existing members of the judiciary with his own supporters and, most horrifyingly, made numerous attempts to overturn the result of the 2020 election culminating in an armed insurgency at Capitol Hill spearheaded by his supporters. Similar examples are regrettably plentiful in Europe: among others, Hungary and Georgia have recently seen significant erosions of democratic accountability. By carefully examining these two European cases, I will argue that democratic backsliding in Europe has been driven by failures of vertical accountability in light of infrequent elections, the creation of supermajorities, polarisation and more. Further, I argue that democratic backsliding is not only normatively problematic but poses a genuine security threat to Europe. I begin by carefully defining democratic backsliding and voter polarisation, and I then lay out a broad argument of the link between failures of vertical accountability and backsliding. I then investigate the two cases studies. I conclude by suggesting policy interventions to mitigate the erosion of democracy specifically designed for a European context.

Georgian Dream Party billboard on October 25, 2024 in Tbilisi, Georgia. (Nicolo Vincenzo Malvestuto/Getty Images).

Key Definitions

I begin by clearly defining two key terms: democratic accountability and democratic backsliding. Firstly, “democratic accountability” refers to the extent to which citizens and institutions can observe and punish political agents who do not act in accordance with the public interest. Accountability comes in two key forms: vertical (VA), where voters directly hold public officials accountable, and horizontal (HA), where institutions such as courts and the media hold officials accountable (Jablonski 2024). VA can be hampered by some key difficulties which are discussed in the following section.

Further, “democratic backsliding” is the “state-led debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy” (Bermeo 2016). In the most extreme cases, it could involve such radical changes in institutions whereby countries go from being full democracies to having “regimes that are unambiguously authoritarian” (Bermeo 2016). This definition clearly links backsliding to accountability: such an elimination of democratic institutions would not be possible if VA and HA were fully effective, and it entails a weakening of the very institutions that should generate this accountability. One specific form of backsliding is known as executive aggrandisement, which can be defined as elected executives gradually weakening the checks and balances that should exist on their power through institutional changes, constitutional changes or otherwise (Bermeo 2016). I focus on this form of backsliding because it has become more common recently; and because of its particularly problematic nature: since it happens gradually, it may be more difficult for voters to identify, and hence particularly difficult to stop. Further, executive aggrandisement occurs through institutional changes that are made legally by a freely elected official and is therefore “legitimised through the very institutions that democracy promoters have prioritised” (Bermeo 2016).

Vertical Accountability

In the political science literature, a variety of explanations exist for democratic backsliding, but I focus on those relating to failures of vertical accountability. A key point about democracy is that it is not self-enforcing: for democracy to survive, voters, politicians and institutions must be willing to protect it. However, vertical accountability has various shortcomings: the infrequency of elections, the possibility of electoral manipulation by the incumbent, a lack of information among voters, the possibility of supermajorities, and polarisation. (Keefer, Khemani 2005). As a result of any combination of these four failures, citizens may be unwilling or unable to hold the executive to account, and hence unable to stop them from rolling back checks and balances, eroding civil rights and overall amassing ever-greater power.

First, the infrequency of elections implies that, once an executive is voted in, they have at least four years to aggrandise before being placed again before the demos. As illustrated by the cases below, a single term is plenty of time for enough backsliding to occur that the following election is unfree. Second, the possibility of electoral manipulation is key: countries that have already started to backslide can find themselves on a slippery slope whereby they are no longer able to remove anti- democratic incumbents. Third, a lack of information among voters can imply that, even if citizens want to protect democracy, they are unable to. Uninformed voters may be unaware of candidates’ positions on democracy, and hence inadvertently elect a politician who is likely to aggrandise. Fourth, the possibility of supermajorities creates an obvious opportunity for broad-based support to lead to backsliding. As evidenced by Hungary, leaders empowered with large parliamentary majorities are able to quickly and effectively remove democratic safeguards on their power. Finally, polarisation can push voters to elect candidates despite them being anti-democratic. Polarisation makes politicians’ positions on ideological issues far more salient and important to voters. Voters may then choose their preferred candidate policy-wise despite them being anti- democratic because switching to an ideologically opposed but pro-democratic candidate becomes more costly.

Hungary

A paradigmatic example of democratic backsliding in Europe is Hungary under the self- described “illiberal democrat” Viktor Orbán. Orbán has aggrandised to the extent that a coalition of MEPs argued that Hungary is no longer a true democracy but rather “a hybrid regime of electoral autocracy”, and the European Council has taken various actions against Hungary for being “in breach of EU values”. (European Parliament 2022) In 2010, when Orbán’s party Fidesz won 68% of National Assembly seats, the leader used his party’s supermajority to launch a constitutional coup d’etat. Here we can see some effects of polarisation: as the electorate became more polarised following economic difficulties in 2008, larger numbers of voters turned to Orbán’s conservative right handing him a parliamentary supermajority. With this power, Hungary’s newly elected Prime Minister began filling “indipendent” institutions with his supporters, introduced retroactive taxation to punish past officeholders, slashed welfare to fund tax cuts for the wealthy, severely limited the powers of trade unions to erase the right to strike, altered electoral laws to limit opposition, consolidated control of state-owned media to silence opposition views, and overall altered the constitution nine times in the span of six months. (Bozoki 2011) All this occurred less than a year following Orbán’s initial win. His supermajority mixed with the infrequency of elections and policy support from some voters allowed him to continue unchallenged. Since then, Orbán has successfully manipulated elections to retain power in 2014, 2018 and 2022 by establishing workfare programs directly contingent on political support and engaging in widespread gerrymandering. (Henault 2022) Overall, initial polarisation handed Orbán a huge majority, which he then used to nullify broader institutions for vertical accountability, thereby ensuring he could easily win following elections and retain power. Beyond being deeply problematic from a normative perspective, democratic backsliding in Hungary poses a serious security risk for Europe. Hungary has repeatedly attempted to undermine NATO and support for Ukraine in the EU and internationally, choosing instead to align with Putin. Hungary therefore remains a key hub for Russian energy exports central to Putin’s war effort. Strengthened by similar illiberal democrats in Slovakia and Türkiye, Orbán has become more closely alligned with autocratic leaders such as Putin and Xi Jinping rather than fellow European politicians. (Benson 2024)

Georgia

Although few European examples are as striking as Hungary, democracy has more recently become at risk in Georgia, and EU-candidate country. The pro-Russian ruling party Georgia Dream has “pushed an increasingly authoritarian agenda” including censoring media, imposing restrictions on the political oppositions’ free speech and discriminating against vulnerable groups. This has proceeded to the extent that a group of MEPs has affirmed that “Georgia’s democracy is at risk” and “unless the legislation is rescinded, progress cannot be made in Georgia’s relations with the EU”. (European Parliament 2024) A particularly striking example of anti-democratic legislation came in 2024, when Georgia Dream passed a Kremlinian law designating Western-funded media and NGOs as “foreign agents”. Activists protesting this law were met with horrifying police brutality. (European Parliament 2024) In the longer term, Georgia Dream has increasingly aggrandised the powers of the executive branch by taking greater control over institutions, security forces and the election commission. As in Hungary, Georgia Dream was initially freely elected and won a large mandate due to voters’ disapproval of the previous president Mikheil Saakashvili’s misconduct. (Fix and Kapp 2023) Arguably. hopeless voters chose to elect the knowingly pro-Russian and already somewhat anti- democratic Georgia Dream as they believed policy and democratic effectiveness could not be worse than during Saakashvili’s final period. This led voters to support Georgia Dream despite its potentially problematic position on democracy. Since then, the government quickly used its executive powers to debilitate systems of vertical accountability, with voter intimidation, vote-buying and pressure on the opposition bring described as “notably widespread and consistent” in the 2021 election. (Delegation of the EU to Georgia 2021) Furthermore, the EU Delegation to Georgia noted “hardened polarisation” in 2021 which has likely worsened since due to the “foreign agents” law. As described above, this could further worsen vertical accountability. As in Hungary, the dangers of democratic backsliding in Georgia are not exclusively domestic: Georgia has helped Russian exporters circumvent sanctions, Prime Minister Garibashvili has echoed Putin’s claim that NATO is to blame for the war in Ukraine and, overall, the country has become an ally of the aforementioned authoritarian leaders. (Fix and Kapp 2023)

Recommendations and Conclusion

Backsliding in Europe is a significant issue, with once-democratic nations regressing to almost fully autocratic rule. The cases studies above of Hungary and Georgia highlight the problem, but it is far more widespread: Turkey, Slovakia and others have seen their democratic instructions bulldozed, and most states are experiencing an alarming rise of the anti-democratic far right. Further, Europe’s proximity to Russia and backsliding countries’ affinity with its murderous dictator pose an alarming threat to the continent and the Union’s safety. However, Europe is well-placed to fight back: there are unique tools at the disposal of EU politicians that could help mitigate the problem. For example, the EU could encourage the implementation of more frequent referenda on leaders in between full elections to mitigate the latter’s infrequency. Further, the EU could strengthen and expand its election monitoring initiatives to better counter vote- buying, fraud and intimidation in member countries. Lack of information could be countered by allocating EU funding to non-partisan media outlets in member and candidate states. Most importantly and uniquely, the EU has Article 7 at its disposal to coerce incumbents who attempt to run roughshod on democracy. Article 7.1 of the EU Treaty allows the European Parliament to launch an investigation into member states who are in serious breach of fundamental EU values such as democracy. Further, Article 7.2 allows the Parliament to enact sanctions against government agents of member states deemed to be in such a breach. (Hegedus 2018) In 2018, MEPs voted to begin procedures under Article 7.1 against Hungary. However, seven years on, little progress has been made, and the country’s situation has further deteriorated. The EU should therefore use the Article 7 tool more swiftly and forcefully against countries that are backsliding. Options to remove their EU votes, sanction incumbents, withhold funding and remove their status as members are key to ensuring domestic governments comply with the standards of democracy. Although the EU can certainly fight back, the continent is particularly endangered by this backsliding. As aforementioned, the clear alliances of European “illiberal democrats” with Putin put all European countries at risk and allow the war in Ukraine to continue on. Furthermore, the veto given to all EU member states and the rotating presidency, while normatively valuable, become practically problematic when electoral autocracies are EU members. In fact, Hungary attempted to use the EU Council’s unanimity rules to force the bloc to review its relationship with Ukraine in Russia’s favour. (Benson 2024)

Ultimately, democratic backsliding in Europe has become a very significant issue, with multiple countries regressing to the status of electoral autocracies. Through the case studies of Hungary and Georgia, I have argued that backsliding occurs due to failures of, and attacks on, vertical accountability. Furthermore, I have established that these countries’ alliances with Russia pose a direct security threat to Europe. Finally, I have reviewed certain policies the EU could use to counter democratic backsliding, especially under the Article 7 mechanism already built into its Treaty.