Lebanon, the Battleground of Giants

Written by Anthony Trad (MSc Political Science)

'All nations have their own interests, but Lebanon has everyone else’s'

Lebanon is known by many metaphors—a message country, the Switzerland of the Middle East, a failed state, a proxy battleground—but above all, it remains a geopolitical playground where foreign powers have, for centuries, shaped its destiny. Much has been written about Iran propping up Hezbollah, Saudi Arabia financing Sunni allies, and France clinging to its former mandate, yet few attempted the scope of that article: map in one place the full spectrum of external forces shaping Lebanon. This article distils their roles and strategic posture into reusable shorthand for understanding who holds sway, how, and to what end. Admittedly, this is an ambitious, perhaps impossible task in just a few paragraphs, inevitably omitting other key actors who also shape Lebanon’s fate. But when Lebanon’s sovereignty remains more myth than reality, and its latest elections confirm once again that presidents are chosen abroad rather than home-made, stepping back to see the bigger picture is essential.

January 9th marked a turning point. After two years of political paralysis, Lebanon deadlock ended with the election of army chief Joseph Aoun, heavily backed—if not imposed—by the Quintet (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt, the US, and France), orchestrating a consensus to block a Hezbollah-aligned presidency.  Right afterwards, Nawaf Salam—former President of the International Court of Justice—was appointed Prime Minister, reinforcing a shift toward figures of institutional credibility rather than factional allegiances. The stakes are high: Hezbollah is weakened after months of Israeli bombardment, Assad’s fall has left an unexpected power vacuum, and Saudi Arabia is cautiously re-engaging. Meanwhile, France and the US are doubling on reform efforts, Qatar is leveraging its unique role as a mediator, the UAE is eyeing economic opportunities, and Israel is recalibrating its security strategy. Lebanon’s fate is discussed, decided, and often discarded in the crumbling facades of Beirut, the diplomatic halls of Riyadh, and the shadowy war rooms of Tehran. Whether this political recalibration signals real change or merely another cycle of dependency remains to be seen.

The Gulf’s Calculated Return: Pragmatism, Investment, and Mediation

For decades, Lebanon’s economic survival has been tethered to Gulf remittances, with expatriates injecting yearly over half of its foreign currency inflows. The Cedars land has become theatre of rivalry, where Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, compete for influence through distinct agendas.

Saudi Arabia— “The “Patron Turned Pragmatist”—once Lebanon’s primary benefactor and land of emigration, poured billions into Sunni politicians and institutions, treating the country as a frontline in its rivalry with Iran. But as Hezbollah entrenched itself and tightened its grip over its Sunni obligés (Saad Hariri), Riyadh’s frustration gave way to indifference and disengagement. The Hariri era faded into silence, taking with it Saudi Arabia’s once-unchecked influence. During this period, Riyadh’s ability to shape Lebanese politics was further constrained by Syria’s control, as Damascus, then Hezbollah’s key logistical and political ally, served as a gatekeeper to Lebanese affairs.

Now, with Hezbollah weakening and Syria Assad’s collapse, Riyadh senses an opening. Prince Faisal bin Farhan’s recent visit to Beirut—the first by a high-ranking Saudi official in over a decade—signals a recalibrated return. This time, Saudi Arabia will not bankroll a broken system. Stability and reform must come first, and financial backing would be conditional on Hezbollah’s diminished role in governance. Riyadh is set to reassert itself as Lebanon’s primary political backer, shaping government formation and economic reconstruction through Gulf-funded projects.

Unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE— “The Calibrated Investor”—has never played the sectarian game, preferring economic leverage over political entanglement. With Lebanon’s banking sector in ruins and foreign capital scarce, Abu Dhabi sees a unique investment opportunity. Pragmatic and strictly transactional, the UAE’s support hinges on clear conditions: no Hezbollah dominance and no wasted resources. Infrastructure, energy, and tourism might attract Emirati investments if sustainable and profitable. Abu Dhabi will play a decisive role in Lebanon’s financial and tourism revamping.

Enter Qatar— “The Generous Mediator”— Lebanon’s diplomatic master, leveraging its channels with Hezbollah and Iran while maintaining ties with Western and Gulf states. Unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which attach strict conditions to their aid, Doha moves fluidly between factions as a needed interlocutor.

As a key player in the Quintet, Qatar was instrumental in securing Joseph Aoun’s presidency, using its influence to facilitate political consensus. But Doha is more than just a mediator—From direct salary payments to Lebanese soldiers to fuel donations to the army, Qatar ensures its presence is felt where others hesitate to step in, while carefully avoiding full alignment with any single bloc. Having endured an embargo to preserve its ties with the’ axis of evil’, including Hezbollah, expect Doha to continue leveraging its financial aid and mediation skills to sustain its influence in Lebanon.

Lebanon’s troublesome neighbours: The Military, Security, and Geopolitical Frontline

Lebanon’s fate is shaped as much by war and security as by diplomacy. While the Gulf wields influence through money and mediation, the country’s reality remains the balance of power between Hezbollah, Israel, and their backers. With Syria’s authority erased, Hezbollah weakened, and Israel recalibrating its military doctrine, long-standing power dynamics are shifting.

For decades, Syria— “The Overstayed Master”— treated Lebanon as an extension of its survival strategy, using it as a buffer zone, financial gateway, and political pawn. Even after withdrawing troops in 2005, Damascus’ influence endured through Hezbollah and intelligence networks. Assad’s 2024 collapse upended this equation, shattering Syria’s grip and stripping Hezbollah of its logistical lifeline—arms routes, financial networks, and narco-trafficking channels. For the first time in five decades, Syria is no longer a power broker, leaving a vacuum Saudi Arabia and France are rushing to fill.

Hezbollah— “The Puppeteer Overlord”— has long been Iran’s strongest regional proxy, embedding itself in Lebanon’s politics, military, and economy while wielding de facto veto state power. Backed by Tehran’s $1 billion annual funding and Syria’s logistical support, it long operated with impunity. But the latest war with Israel crippled its infrastructure and Iran is reassessing its commitments. Hassan Nasrallah’s death has deepened Hezbollah’s internal power struggle at a precarious moment.

Hezbollah is deeply entrenched in Lebanon’s Shiite community (40% of the population) ensuring its political survival and making its military dismantling implausible. However, its unchecked dominance is no longer assured. A shift now seems inevitable from a military powerhouse to a more politically driven entity. Integrating Hezbollah’s armed factions into the Lebanese Army under a special statute should mirror Syria’s new ruler’s restructuring of the Ba’athist paramilitary forces. If Iran continues deprioritising Lebanon, Hezbollah will have no choice but to adapt—trading military supremacy to a political presence allowing Lebanese institutions to regain control fully.

For Israel— “The Relentless Adversary” — Lebanon has never been a fully sovereign state but rather always a security problem next door. Since Black September (1970) and the arrival of the PLO’s headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon became a staging ground for Palestinian factions, drawing Israel deeper into its affairs. Following the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon in 1982, Tel Aviv’s policy has revolved around one core objective: neutralising its archenemy, Hezbollah. Through containment, deterrence, and precision strikes, Israel has sought to degrade Hezbollah’s military capabilities without triggering full-scale war. But the latest conflict is different—longer, deadlier, and more strategically consequential than any before. Southern Lebanon is in ruins, a quarter of Lebanon’s population displaced, Hezbollah’s leader dead, and its arsenal depleted, putting the militia out of harm’s way.

Expect Israel to maintain deterrence but in the long run, will it settle for containment and pursue total dismantlement, or fall deeper into Netanyahu’s dangerous “Greater Israel” ambitions?

Western Influence and Reform Agendas

For Washington— “The Watchful Balancer” —Lebanon has always been about three things: spy nests in the 1960s, countering Hezbollah over the past 20 years, and averting total collapse in the last 18 months. The US has poured over $3 billion in defensive military aid for the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) over the past decade, hoping to bolster a state-controlled military counterweight to Hezbollah. Washington’s policy reflects this ambiguity: unwavering support for Israel, survival-driven aid to the LAF, and open hostility toward Hezbollah.

The latest U.S. push has been diplomatic, aligning with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Qatar to broker a power-sharing deal that secured Joseph Aoun’s presidency and Nawaf Salam’s premiership. Washington views this leadership as a rare opportunity to push for real governance reforms and curb Hezbollah’s institutional grip. Yet, Lebanon’s place in US calculus remains tied to broader US-Iran dynamics—if Tehran de-escalates elsewhere, Lebanon may slip further down Washington’s priority list.

No foreign power has a deeper emotional stake in Lebanon than France— “The Self-Appointed Guardian.” Often called Al-Oum Al-Hanoun (the loving mother), its legacy dates back to King Saint Louis’ties with Mount Lebanon’s Christians. Today, Paris still sees Lebanon as a lost child, a remnant of its colonial past. This paternalistic sentiment fuels its ritualistic interventions, most notably Emmanuel Macron’s post-explosion visits in 2020, where he proposed reforms, secured aid pledges, and publicly chastised Lebanese elites, yet only to be met with polite nods and political inertia.

Despite diminished leverage, France remains Lebanon’s strongest advocate in the EU, its sole Western interlocutor with embargoed Hezbollah, and a key orchestrator of international donor conferences since 2000. However, this time, Paris holds two key advantages: Nawaf Salam, a Sorbonne & Sciences Po graduate, commands deep respect in French diplomatic circles, and the EU increasingly sees Lebanon’s stability as critical to managing migration flows. Macron is expected to push aggressively for EU-led aid, linked to transparency and infrastructure projects. The era of French political patronage is fading—replaced by a pragmatic economic and institutional approach.

Lebanon’s tragedy is that decision-making in this small, uniquely diverse country has never truly belonged to its people. Its political class has long sold its loyalties to the highest bidder, be it Riyadh, Tehran, or Washington, while the country survives on a suicidal business model: exporting its brightest minds while depending on importing their remittances to keep a crumbling system afloat. After decades of militia-turned-politicians mismanaging the state, Lebanon has a unique opportunity with this new duo, Aoun-Salam, to rebuild a functional state backed by Arab investment and Western oversight.

The acute need for a monopolistic national army, structural reforms, anti-corruption measures, restoration of judicial power, and financial system overhaul is known to all. But their success depends on more consistent internal willpower and international backing – no more foreign dictates. The world is watching, but for once, Lebanon has a chance to lead itself.